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Crane and Tufts in Reverse: The Fair Market Value Firewall
Rodney P. Mock*
ABSTRACT
This article examines the appropriate tax treatment of property
(subject to nonrecourse debt in excess of its fair market value) in
the corporate context. The article reviews the Supreme Court cases
of Crane and Tufts and their subsequent statutory and regulatory
influence on over-leveraged contributions and distributions. Aca-
demics and other commentators contend the cost basis in certain
transactions of such property could be anything from zero to the fair
market value of the property, or equal to the amount of encumber-
ing debt. In the corporate arena, academics argue the fair market
value basis limits under Internal Revenue Code §§ 301(d) and
334(a) to the distributee shareholder of such property produces il-
logical and inconsistent results at both the shareholder and entity
levels. At the entity level, § 362(d)(1) also limits a transferee corpo-
ration's basis in such property to its fair market value. This article
discusses the "functional relationship" between basis and amount
realized in light of excess debt property contributions and distribu-
tions. The article concludes with a finding that Crane and Tufts'
desired symmetry is preserved under such circumstances producing
consistent economic results for both the corporation and the
shareholders.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a darker side to the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Crane v.
Commissioner and Commissioner v. Tufts where very little legal gui-
dance exists, leaving academics with no intellectual reprieve.' The
question never squarely addressed in either case, as it was on the re-
verse side of the transaction (i.e., the buyer's side versus the seller's
side), was: what exactly is a taxpayer's "basis" when property is pur-
chased (or transferred) and the property is subject to nonrecourse
debt in excess of the property's fair market value ("excess debt prop-
* Rodney P. Mock, J.D. LL.M., California Polytechnic State University, Assistant Professor,
Business Building (03), Office No. 03-424, Telephone No. (805) 756-2730, Email:
rmock@calpoly.edu.
1. 331 U.S. 1 (1947); 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
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erty")? 2 Academics have theorized three possible purchaser basis
outcomes for excess debt property: (1) zero, (2) the fair market value
of the property, or (3) the entire amount of debt encumbering the
property.3 The issue of excess debt property and its appropriate basis
has been extensively debated in the partnership context.4 It has also
been analyzed outside of the entity context, in various purchase trans-
actions.5 This Article will discuss the proper basis of such property in
the corporate context. The Article will elaborate on excess debt prop-
erty implications after Crane and Tufts, following their logic through
various Subchapter C contributions and distributions. It will also fo-
cus particular attention on the basis of such property to a transferee
corporation and distributee shareholder under §§ 362(d)(1), 301(d)
and 334(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the
"Code"). This article does not discuss corporate distributions of ex-
cess debt property subject to recourse debt, which arguably consti-
tutes a capital contribution in the amount of the excess debt assumed
by the shareholder. 6 Furthermore, it is difficult to conceive of any
situation where a shareholder or corporation would willingly suffer
economically by assuming recourse debt in excess of the secured prop-
erty's fair market value in light of the basis limitations described
herein. Whereas, with nonrecourse debt, because only the lender is
2. The United States Supreme Court in Crane discussed nonrecourse debt that was "less than"
the property's fair market value, and in Tufts, the Court never discussed the basis of the pur-
chaser of the property, which was valued at less than the nonrecourse debt that it was subject to.
3. Erik M. Jensen, The Unanswered Question in Tufts: What Was the Purchaser's Basis?, 10
VA. TAX REV. 455, 483-84 (1991) ("Bayles acquired the Tufts property in a fully taxable transac-
tion, and his basis in the property was therefore his cost. Cost is not a self-defining concept,
however, and it is applied in different ways in different contexts. Putting aside the effect of the
small amount of cash paid, everyone assumes the controlling figure for Bayles should have been
one of three numbers: $1.85 million (reflecting the entire amount of the liability); zero (treating
the obligation as no liability at all with respect to Bayles); or $1.4 million (limiting the basis to
the fair market value of the unencumbered property). Each figure has some arguments in its
favor, and each set of arguments is presented in turn.").
4. See, e.g., L. Scott Stafford, Section 752(c): The Other Issue in Tufts v. Commissioner, 42 TAX
LAW. 93 (1988); Claire E. Toth, Nonrecourse Debt in Excess of Fair Market Value and Disappear-
ing Basis: The Partnership Paradox, 50 TAX LAW. 37 (1996); Daniel S. Goldberg, Nonrecourse
Debt in Excess of Fair Market Value: The Confluence of Basis, Realization, Subchapter K and the
Need for Consistency, 51 TAX LAW. 41 (1997).
5. See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEiN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 297 (9th ed. 2002); Calvin
H. Johnson, The Front End of the Crane Rule, 47 TAX NoTEs 593 (1990).
6. Charlotte Crane, Toward a Theory of the Corporate Tax Base: The Effect of a Corporate
Distribution of Encumbered Property to Shareholders, 44 TAX L. REV. 113, 144 (1988) ("The
amendments produce inappropriate results where recourse liabilities exceed the fair market
value of the property to which they relate. Current § 336(b) ignores the fact that the shareholder
could have provided the same benefit to the corporation through a contribution to capital.
When a shareholder assumes liabilities exceeding the fair market value of the property, the ex-
cess should not produce corporate gain.").
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liable for the debt, receiving excess debt property subject to such debt
is theoretically plausible.
The language of §§ 362(d)(1), 301(d), and 334(a) create what the
author calls a "fair market value firewall," or absolute limit, to a trans-
feree's basis in such property, notwithstanding the excess debt as-
sumed.7 Some academics argue a fair market value limit to basis
produces inconsistent and illogical results at both the corporate and
shareholder levels.8 In furtherance of this discussion, this article will
review the origins of inclusion of nonrecourse debt in a taxpayer's
"basis" and the "amount realized." The article will hypothesize the
basis of such property as being one of the three possibilities men-
tioned above. At its conclusion, the author contends the fair market
value limits are entirely consistent with the symmetrical or functional
relationship between basis and amount realized as discussed in Crane
and Tufts. The relationship is preserved as a direct consequence of
the treasury regulations. Before discussing the fair market value fire-
wall to basis, however, a review of the landmark cases of Crane and
Tufts is warranted.
II. THE BIRTH OF NONRECOURSE DEBT BASIS
In the vast majority of taxpayer transactions, the beginning point
for any basis analysis is a taxpayer's unadjusted "cost basis" under
§ 1012.9 Naturally, there are several exceptions to cost basis for prop-
erty acquired by inheritance, gift, in nonrecognition transactions, etc.,
but this topic is left untouched for a future discussion. A taxpayer's
basis (regardless of how acquired) is then adjusted upward or down-
ward under § 1016 to account for depreciation deductions, capital ex-
penditures, etc.10 The concept of a taxpayer receiving a cost basis
when purchasing property is commonly understood, even among non-
7. I.R.C. § 301(d) (2006) ("The basis of property received in a distribution to which subsection
(a) applies shall be the fair market value of such property."); § 334(a) ("If property is received in
a distribution in complete liquidation, and if gain or loss is recognized on receipt of such prop-
erty, then the basis of the property in the hands of the distributee shall be the fair market value
of such property at the time of the distribution."); § 362(d)(1) ("In no event shall the basis of any
property be increased under subsection (a) or (b) above the fair market value of such property
(determined without regard to section 7701(g)) by reason of any gain recognized to the trans-
feror as a result of the assumption of a liability.").
8. Boyd C. Randall & Dave N. Stewart, Corporate Distributions: Handling Liabilities in Ex-
cess of the Fair Market Value of Property Remains Unresolved, 19 J. CORP. TAX'N 55 (1992).
9. I.R.C. § 1012(a) ("The basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except as other-
wise provided in this subchapter and subchapters C (relating to corporate distributions and ad-
justments), K (relating to partners and partnerships), and P (relating to capital gains and
losses).").
10. I.R.C. § 1016(a).
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tax professionals, as the rationale has been around for some time now
- long before the case of Crane, which memorialized the fundamental
tax principle of debt basis. 1 The Crane case involved a taxpayer's
basis in inherited property, and its primary holding of including debt
in basis was later extended to purchase money debt transactions. 12
Crane debt basis concepts can now also be found in certain statutory
sections involving various corporate transactions. 13 Under the present
law, cost basis principles apply regardless of whether or not a pur-
chaser pays with cash, borrows the funds to acquire the property, "as-
sumes" debt in connection with the acquisition of property, or takes
property "subject to" debt. Put another way, it is now generally un-
derstood that debt is to be included in cost basis, regardless of
whether it is "recourse" or "nonrecourse.' 4
Prior to the Crane case, the law concerning debt basis was not as
clear, particularly with regard to property acquired encumbered by
"nonrecourse" debt.15 The legal issue was whether taxpayers should
receive a tax benefit of basis "credit" for debt they were not economi-
cally at risk for. 16 Additional basis for nonrecourse debt is, of course,
a good thing for a taxpayer, as less gain (or more loss) is recognized
upon disposition of the subject asset, and depreciation deductions on
depreciable property will be greater as a consequence of the higher
basis (assuming the at-risk and passive activity rules do not apply).' 7
11. See Brons Hotels, Inc. v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936).
12. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 456 (1st Cir. 1950).
13. See infra notes 115-254 and accompanying text.
14. Recourse debt exists where the obligor remains personally liable for the debt. Whereas,
nonrecourse debt is debt in which the creditor's only recourse is against the collateral secured by
the debt, if any. Lenders in real estate transactions will typically lend on a nonrecourse basis
because of the appreciating nature of the asset. When dealing with partnership liabilities, the
regulations specifically provide definitions of recourse and nonrecourse liability in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-1 (2005).
15. Because the lender of nonrecourse debt has no "recourse," except against the collateral
secured thereby, a purchaser generally never "assumes" nonrecourse debt, at least with respect
to any economic risk of loss. A purchaser may assume or take over the payments and the obliga-
tion to remit net rentals from the asset to the lender, but a purchaser is not going to assume any
personal exposure, and a seller would have no incentive to entice a purchaser to do so. The
property is, therefore, taken "subject to" the nonrecourse debt.
16. In the recourse context, the buyer typically "assumes" debt the seller is personally liable
for and, therefore, such is identical to purchasing with cash, as the seller is being relieved of a
personal obligation as a result of the assumption.
17. See I.R.C. §§ 465, 469 (2006). The "at-risk" rules in § 465 limit a taxpayer's ability to use
nonrecourse debt to generate allowable losses, except for in certain qualified real estate financ-
ing arrangements. This is because the taxpayer is not at-risk in the activity to the extent it is
financed by nonrecourse debt. The "passive activity" rules contained in § 469 limit a taxpayer's
ability to claim passive losses which can only be deducted against "passive income." A passive
activity is any trade or business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. Limited
partners in limited partnerships almost always fail the material participation test. There are
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As discussed in greater detail below, Crane held that nonrecourse
debt should be included in a taxpayer's basis.18 As a direct result of
Crane, nonrecourse debt is now generally understood to be part of a
purchaser's cost basis.19 For estate tax purposes, nonrecourse debt
may also be part of a beneficiary's stepped-up (or down) basis under
§ 1014, in that the date of death (or alternative valuation date) "fair
market value" basis is unreduced by any debt the devised or be-
queathed property may be subject to.20 The same holds true for prop-
erty acquired by gift under § 1015.21 A donee takes a "carryover"
basis equal to that of the donor, again undiminished by any debt en-
cumbering the property. The logic of Crane debt basis is also evi-
denced in Subchapter C when contributions are made to a corporation
by its shareholders, and when a corporation distributes its property to
shareholders. In each scenario, the transferee corporation or share-
holder takes a fair market value basis in the assets received, again
unreduced by any subject mortgages.22
The Supreme Court decided the Crane case in 1947, and it involved
the Revenue Act of 1938.23 The taxpayer in the case was Beulah
Crane, an elderly woman who inherited an apartment building and
land from her late husband, which was subject to debt in the amount
of $262,042, of which $7,042 was interest in default.24 The court
records were not clear on whether or not the debt was recourse to Mr.
Crane, but the Commissioner and Mrs. Crane both agreed the debt
was "nonrecourse" as it applied to her.2 5 On the date of her hus-
band's death, the property had a fair market value exactly equal to the
some limited exceptions to the passive loss limitation rules for passive losses generated by cer-
tain passive rental activities where a certain amount may be deducted.
18. The Court also held that such debt is included in the taxpayer's amount realized, which is
discussed later in this article.
19. I.R.C. § 1012.
20. I.R.C. § 1014(a).
21. I.R.C. § 1015(a).
22. A general definition of "fair market value" cannot be found in the I.R.C. for income tax,
estate, and gift tax purposes, although courts have adopted the definition contained in the trea-
sury regulations, which state, "[t]he fair market value is the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion
to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-
1(c)(2) (as amended in 2005); 1.412(c)(2)-1(c)(1) (1993); 1.1445-1(g)(7) (as amended in 2003).
23. See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 4 (1947).
24. Id. at 3 ("Petitioner was the sole beneficiary and the executrix of the will of her husband,
who died January 11, 1932. He then owned an apartment building and lot subject to a mortgage,
which secured a principal debt of $255,000.00 and interest in default of $7,042.50. As of that
date, the property was appraised for federal estate tax purposes at a value exactly equal to the
total amount of this encumbrance.").
25. Id.
2011]
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amount of debt encumbering it.26 The parties did not dispute the
property's appraised value or the outstanding loan amount. 27 After
inheriting the property, Mrs. Crane continued to operate the apart-
ment building for nearly seven years, during which time she remitted
the net rentals to the mortgagor, and, for tax purposes, she reported
gross rentals as income and deducted real property taxes, operating
expenses, interest paid on the mortgage, and depreciation for the
physical exhaustion of the building.28 During her brief period of own-
ership, the arrearage of interest on the mortgage grew to $15,857.29
This presumably was because the country was in a great depression
and the net rent was insufficient. Eventually, the mortgagor
threatened her with foreclosure. 30 To avoid foreclosure, Mrs. Crane
sold the property to a third party for $3,000 cash, subject to the nonre-
course mortgage (principal and accrued interest). 31 To facilitate the
sale, Mrs. Crane paid $500 to cover various sale-related expenses. 32
After the disposition, she reported taxable gain in the amount of
$1,250 on her tax return. 33 Her stance was that for the purposes of
determining her inherited basis in the apartment building and the
land, the fair market value of such property at the time of her hus-
band's death, and the term "property" in the statute (i.e., the Revenue
Act of 1938) referred only to her "equity" interest, and therefore her
inherited basis was zero. 34 Applying the same rationale to her
"amount realized," she concluded it was $2,500 (i.e., the net-cash re-
ceived), resulting in $2,500 of realized capital gain (i.e., $2,500 - $0),
of which, only $1,250 was recognized under the then-existing capital
gain rules.35 Her tenuous tax position naturally was entirely inconsis-
tent with her previously claimed depreciation deductions totaling
26. Id.
27. Id. at 5 n.4 ("The parties stipulated as to the relative parts of the 1932 appraised value and
of the 1938 sales price, which were allocable to land and building.").





33. Crane, 331 U.S. at 3.
34. Id. at 3-4 ("Petitioner reported a taxable gain of $1,250.00. Her theory was that the 'prop-
erty' which she had acquired in 1932 and sold in 1938 was only the equity, or the excess in the
value of the apartment building and lot over the amount of the mortgage. This equity was of
zero value when she acquired it. No depreciation could be taken on a zero value. Neither she
nor her vendee ever assumed the mortgage, so, when she sold the equity, the amount she real-
ized on the sale was the net cash received, or $2,500.00. This sum less the zero basis constituted
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$28,045 against the illusive building basis.36 The depreciation deduc-
tions were premised on the notion that she inherited property with a
basis above zero. 37
The Commissioner disagreed with Mrs. Crane, stating her inherited
basis in the property was its fair market value at the date of her hus-
band's death, undiminished by the mortgage, and as a consequence,
Mrs. Crane recognized $23,767 of gain on the sale of the building.38
The Commissioner was not exactly a "big fan" of Mrs. Crane's theory
that the term "property" for the purposes of determining basis re-
ferred only to her equity in the asset, rather the Commissioner con-
tended the term "property" referred to the physical property itself,
not its mere equity.39 The U.S. Tax Court, on the other hand, agreed
with Mrs. Crane's imaginative definition, and thus, her initial basis
was zero.40 The Commissioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, and the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's decision in favor of the Commissioner.41 The case then pro-
ceeded up to the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the issue.
The Supreme Court held that the plain meaning of "property"
meant a "physical thing" that is subject to ownership and not mere
equity as suggested by Mrs. Crane.42 The Court stated that if Con-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Crane, 331 U.S. at 4-5 ("The Commissioner, however, determined that petitioner realized
a net taxable gain of $23,767.03. His theory was that the 'property' acquired and sold was not
the equity, as petitioner claimed, but rather the physical property itself, or the owner's rights to
possess, use, and dispose of it, undiminished by the mortgage. The original basis thereof was
$262,042.50, its appraised value in 1932. Of this value, $55,000.00 was allocable to land and
$207,042.50 to building. During the period that petitioner held the property, there was an allow-
able depreciation of $28,045.10 on the building, so that the adjusted basis of the building at the
time of sale was $178,997.40. The amount realized on the sale was said to include not only the
$2,500.00 net cash receipts, but also the principal amount of the mortgage subject to which the
property was sold, both totaling $257,500.00. The selling price was allocable in the proportion:
$54,471.15 to the land and $203,028.85 to the building. The Commissioner agreed that the land
was a 'capital asset,' but thought that the building was not. Thus, he determined that petitioner
sustained a capital loss of $528.85 on the land, of which 50% or $264.42 was taken into account,
and an ordinary gain of $24,031.45 on the building, or a net taxable gain as indicated.").
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5 ("The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner that the building was not a 'capital
asset.' In all other respects, it adopted petitioner's contentions, and expunged the deficiency.").
41. Id.
42. Id. at 6-7 ("The only relevant definitions of 'property' to be found in the principal stan-
dard dictionaries are the two favored by the Commissioner - i.e., either that 'property' is the
physical thing which is a subject of ownership, or that it is the aggregate of the owner's rights to
control and dispose of that thing. 'Equity' is not given as a synonym, nor do either of the forego-
ing definitions suggest that it could be correctly so used. Indeed, 'equity' is defined as 'the value
of a property ... above the total of the hens .... The contradistinction could hardly be more
pointed.").
222 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
gress intended to convey the meaning of "equity," it would have done
so with appropriate statutory language.43 In addition, if basis only
represented a property's equity, it would have a direct negative impact
on depreciation calculations, as the annual deductions computed
under such a theory would only represent a fraction of a depreciable
property's true physical exhaustion. 44 The Court concluded that Mrs.
Crane's inherited basis in the building and the land was the full value
of the property, unreduced by any mortgages. 45
III. THE CRANE COURT'S ECONOMIC BENEFIT ENTANGLEMENT
Although the debt was nonrecourse, and the purchaser neither
paid-off the debt, nor expressly assumed it, the fact that the property
was taken "subject to" the debt was sufficient to require its inclusion
in Mrs. Crane's amount realized."6 Making the same argument, Mrs.
Crane unsuccessfully asserted again that the only property she sold
was her equity interest, and thus, the nonrecourse debt should not be
included in her amount realized.47 The Court disagreed. The Court
initially rested its holding on the "functional relationship" between
the taxpayer's basis and amount realized, reasoning that because
"property" includes debt in Mrs. Crane's tax basis, symmetrical treat-
ment warrants similar treatment for her amount realized. 48
The Court stated, "The crux of this case, really, is whether the law
permits her to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in
computing gain. We have already showed that, if it does, the taxpayer
can enjoy a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss of assets.""49
The Court's loose "double deduction" language generated some con-
fusion later on for lower courts attempting to wrestle with Crane's
peculiar phraseology, as the real issue at hand was not necessarily
43. Crane, 331 U.S. at 8.
44. Id. at 9-10.
45. Id. at 11 ("We conclude that the proper basis under § 113(a)(5) is the value of the prop-
erty, undiminished by mortgages thereon, and that the correct basis here was $262,042.50.").
46. Id. at 14 ("[W]e think that a mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt, who sells the
property subject to the mortgage and for additional consideration, realizes a benefit in the
amount of the mortgage as well as the boot.").
47. Id. at 13 ("She argues, conversely, that because only $2,500.00 was realized on the sale, the
'property' sold must have been the equity only, and that consequently we are forced to accept
her contention as to the meaning of 'property' in § 113. We adhere, however, to what we have
already said on the meaning of 'property,' and we find that the absurdity is avoided by our
conclusion that the amount of the mortgage is properly included in the 'amount realized' on the
sale.").
48. Crane, 331 U.S. at 12 ("[T]he functional relation of the two sections requires that the word
mean the same in one section that it does in the other.").
49. Id. at 15-16.
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about Mrs. Crane being able to deduct losses twice. 50 The ability to
exclude subsequent gain is also not conceptually identical to deducting
a tax loss twice, even though both may result in a reduction in income.
The Court's double deduction language in this regard did not attack
the core issue. The real issue was that Mrs. Crane was permitted to
receive income "tax-free" when she received her debt basis, and sym-
metry demands the nonrecourse debt also be included in her amount
realized upon a subsequent disposition or sale. Otherwise, her previ-
ous tax-free receipt of income would forever escape taxation.5 1 In
other words, Mrs. Crane took depreciation deductions against her in-
come, deductions generated by her debt basis. Without such a recon-
ciling event, she would have received the income she took deductions
against tax-free. Furthermore, if her depreciation deductions were
not "recaptured" by including the nonrecourse debt in the amount
realized, then she would be permitted to deduct losses she did not
"economically" sustain.5 2
To illustrate, assume a building has a date of death value of $100x
and nonrecourse debt encumbering it of $100X. 53 Further assume
Mrs. Crane inherits the property and pays interest only on the mort-
gage. She also claims tax depreciation deductions in the amount of
$40x. She then sells the property at a time when its fair market value
is $110x. The buyer pays nothing more than $10x cash and takes the
property subject to the nonrecourse debt. Under Mrs. Crane's theory,
her "amount realized" would be $10x, representing the cash received
for the "equity" in the property. As a result, she would recognize a
tax loss of $50x (i.e., $10x - $60x). This does not make any sense
economically, however, as she is not "losing" anything - the lender is.
The application of such a theory would permit her to fully utilize the
debt basis she acquired tax-free against $100x of her income (i.e., $40x
in depreciation, $10x offsetting the $10x of recognized gain, and a
50. Laura E. Cunningham & Noel B. Cunningham, The Story of Tufts: The "Logic" of Taxing
Nonrecourse Transactions, in BUSINESS TAX STORIEs 239, 245 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark
eds., 2005) ("[T]he problem in Crane was not that Mrs. Crane would be permitted to deduct
losses twice, it was that inclusion of the liability in basis amounts to tax free receipt of income,
and when that liability is extinguished, the income must be accounted for, or forever escape
taxation. A contrary result would allow deduction by her of losses she did not economically
suffer. While the Crane court seemed to grasp that notion, by cloaking the problem in terms of a




53. For the sake of simplicity, I am excluding the land from the analysis, as land is not depre-
ciable apart from improvements or physical developments added to it. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-2 (1960).
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$50x loss). Income that, but for the tax-free debt basis, she would
have paid taxes on. Under the Court's theory, however, the entire
nonrecourse debt would be included in her amount realized, and she
would recognize $50x in gain (i.e., $110x - $60x). Her gain recognized
and realized thereby fully offsets the $40x in depreciation previously
claimed, and her newfound $10x of cash.
When the Crane court ineloquently used the phrase "double deduc-
tion," one envisions claiming depreciation deductions on an asset and
also a loss on its subsequent sale. A loss on the sale or exchange of
any asset occurs when a taxpayer's basis is in excess of the amount
realized. It is the amount of basis in excess of the amount realized
that is taken as a tax loss (assuming no loss limitations apply). As
discussed below, this is not always the case, however, for some taxpay-
ers. The Court's "double deduction" language may also have meant
the taxpayer was permitted to take depreciation deductions during the
life of the asset, and then offset any gain on its disposition with re-
maining debt basis. This interpretation, as illustrated below, is also
strained.
Assume Mrs. Crane instead claimed $90x of depreciation on the
building before its sale, with the property still having nonrecourse
debt of $100x and a fair market value of $110x. Under Mrs. Crane's
"equity only" theory, again, her amount realized would be $10x. This
time, however, she would have no gain or loss from the transaction, as
her $10x basis remaining would exactly offset the amount realized
(i.e., $10x - $10x). Notice that the Court's concept of claiming a
"double loss" does not exist here. A loss is only taken at a sale if basis
is in excess of the amount realized. Mrs. Crane's theory nevertheless
would allow her to fully utilize her tax-free debt basis against $100x of
her income without the necessity of a loss at the sale (i.e., $90x via
depreciation deductions and $10x against the cash received). Under
the Court's theory, Mrs. Crane's amount realized would again be
$110x and her realized and recognized gain would be $100x (i.e.,
$110x - $10x), thus fully recapturing the $90x of depreciation deduc-
tions previously taken and taxing her on the receipt of $10x in cash.
If the above property were fully depreciated under Mrs. Crane's
interpretation, she would recognize $10x of gain (i.e., $10x - $Ox).
Even so, the taxpayer would still not be claiming losses twice. Under
this scenario, although the taxpayer was permitted to take deprecia-
tion deductions, she has no remaining debt basis to offset any subse-
quent gain. Under these circumstances, she would have received
$100x of tax-free debt basis that offset $100x of her actual income in
the form of depreciation deductions. Under the Court's approach, her
[Vol. 9:215
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amount realized would be $110x resulting in $110x of income (i.e.,
$110x - $Ox). Notice how the Court's approach properly accounts for
all of the depreciation previously claimed and the cash received.
The above examples illustrate that when Mrs. Crane received the
$100x of nonrecourse debt tax-free and was permitted to include that
debt in her basis, the "functional relationship" between basis and
amount realized warranted symmetrical treatment between the two.
No one would doubt that if rather than acquiring the property subject
to the nonrecourse debt, the purchaser had simply paid Mrs. Crane
cash directly to pay off the debt, then the cash received would be in-
cluded in her amount realized. The conceptual difficulty encountered
with including nonrecourse debt in Mrs. Crane's amount realized re-
sides in the fact that her "debt relief" at the sale is not the same as
liability relief in the recourse context, where debt relief is the func-
tional equivalent of receiving cash. In other words, a purchaser's as-
sumption of recourse debt is the same as the seller receiving cash
outright. When a seller is personally liable for debt and the recourse
debt is forgiven by a lender, this triggers discharge of indebtedness
income. This is also very similar to receiving cash directly. On the
other hand, when a purchaser acquires property subject to nonre-
course debt (or a lender forecloses on the property), the original
owner is not exactly being "relieved" of anything, as the original
owner was not personally liable or economically at risk for the obliga-
tion in the first place - unlike recourse debt, where debt relief is iden-
tical to receiving cash if the debt is assumed in a sale (or forgiven by
the lender). If property is foreclosed upon, and the lender later for-
gives recourse debt, this also triggers discharge of indebtedness in-
come, as the taxpayer was permitted to receive the loan proceeds and
Crane debt basis tax-free.
Now, if a lender "loaned" a taxpayer $100x cash, pursuant to a non-
recourse promissory note securing no collateral, the "loan" is charac-
terized as a "gift" or taxable income (most likely a gift). A lender,
however, would never engage in such a spectacular transaction, as
nonrecourse debt logically must be secured by collateral, otherwise
the lender is giving away "free money." The tax-free receipt of in-
come in the nonrecourse scenario will thus always be evidenced in the
tax basis of the secured collateral - usually real estate. Receiving a
tax basis in many respects is substantially similar to receiving the pro-
ceeds directly, because once a taxpayer has tax basis, the taxpayer
may depreciate its depreciable collateral, generating depreciation de-
ductions. As set forth in the examples above, if the asset is sold later
at a loss (regardless of whether the asset was depreciable), per Mrs.
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Crane's theory, the taxpayer may then also enjoy a loss deduction.
These deductions, whether depreciation or loss deductions, would be
claimed against the taxpayer's income, reducing it accordingly. As a
result, the taxpayer is indirectly receiving the reduced income "tax-
free. ' 54 Although the path of analysis is slightly attenuated, it is just a
matter of stepping over to the vantage point on the other side of the
fence to see the taxpayer's tax-free receipt of income. It would be
another story if a taxpayer had no offsetting income to fully utilize the
deductions and losses. Nevertheless, conceptually, it is the tax-free
receipt of income that justifies symmetrical inclusion of nonrecourse
debt in a seller's amount realized.
Notwithstanding this intrinsic symmetrical relationship, the Crane
court in the middle of its majority opinion abruptly resigned its func-
tional relationship line of reasoning. As if attempting to catch a but-
terfly with intellect, the Court chased after a completely new theory,
focusing on Mrs. Crane's "economic benefit" received when she was
relieved of the nonrecourse debt. In its analysis, the Court analogized
nonrecourse debt to recourse debt, stating that in certain circum-
stances they should be treated as the same.55 According to the Crane
court, an owner of mortgaged property will treat nonrecourse debt
exactly like recourse debt if the property's fair market value is greater
than the debt.56 In other words, in holding that nonrecourse debt
should be included in the seller's amount realized, the court centered
on the fact that if a seller has an "equity interest" in the property sold
(subject to the nonrecourse debt), the seller presumably would treat
the nonrecourse debt just like any other debt (i.e., recourse debt).57 A
54. Tax deductions are not "dollar-for-dollar," like certain credits are, as deductions merely
reduce a taxpayer's taxable income, which is subject to a marginal tax rate. Notwithstanding this
idea, a taxpayer can economically receive an identical amount of income "tax-free" to the extent
of the loan proceeds. For example, assume an asset has a fair market value of $10Ox and is
subject to nonrecourse debt in the amount of $100x. Further assume the asset's basis is depreci-
ated to zero and the taxpayer received $100x of depreciation deductions. The taxpayer was
permitted to offset her other taxable income by $100x, which is identical to the taxpayer receiv-
ing the loan proceeds of $100x directly. I suspect the only difference is a matter of timing, and
time-value-of-money principles, as the taxpayer had to wait with regard to the depreciation de-
ductions and thereby the receipt of the tax-free income, unless the property was qualifying prop-
erty under I.R.C. § 179 and the taxpayer elected to expense the entire amount permitted under
the statute.
55. Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947) ("We are rather concerned with the reality that an
owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the property will sell, must and
will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he
transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage
were discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another.").
56. Id.
57. See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 50, at 244.
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seller with an equity interest in property will most likely not walk
away from the property, surrendering it to the jaws of foreclosure.5 8
Rather, the seller will avoid foreclosure at all costs by making pay-
ments to protect its underlying equity interest.5 9 This is because the
seller has an economic interest or benefit in the transaction; namely,
the amount of boot received, representing the excess of the property's
fair market value over nonrecourse debt assumed. In hindsight, the
underpinnings of the Crane decision should have rested exclusively on
the functional relationship analysis.60 The Court nevertheless felt
compelled to walk out onto an anemic analytical plank and bifurcated
its analysis, focusing on Mrs. Crane's theoretical economic benefit in
the transaction. 61 Recourse debt and nonrecourse debt, however, are
not always treated identically - particularly if the property is fore-
closed upon or deeded back to the lender in lieu of foreclosure. Un-
like in Crane, if property is subject to recourse debt and foreclosed
upon, only the fair market value of the property is included in the
amount realized, not the entire amount of the debt.62 If the lender in
the future decides to forgive any deficiency, this constitutes "discharge
of indebtedness income" under § 108 at that particular point in time.63
When property subject to recourse debt is surrendered to the lender
in lieu of foreclosure, similar results occur. Only the fair market value
of the asset is considered in satisfaction of the obligation, and thus,
included in the amount realized. Any outstanding obligation amount,
if and when forgiven, again constitutes discharge of indebtedness in-
come at such time.
In the end, the Crane court determined Mrs. Crane's amount real-
ized was comprised of the principal amount of the nonrecourse debt
outstanding and the cash boot received.64 The Court stated that be-
58. See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 50, at 244.
59. See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 50, at 244.
60. See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 50, at 244.
61. See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 50, at 244.
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(2) (1980) ("The amount realized on a sale or other disposition of
property that secures a recourse liability does not include amounts that are (or would be if
realized and recognized) income from the discharge of indebtedness under section 61(a)(12).
For situations where amounts arising from the discharge of indebtedness are not realized and
recognized, see section 108 and § 1.61-12(b)(1).").
63. Under I.R.C. § 108 (2006), discharge of indebtedness income is included in the taxpayer's
gross income. This is assuming none of the exclusions under § 108(a) apply, such as bankruptcy,
insolvency, qualified farm indebtedness, qualified real property business indebtedness, or quali-
fied principal residence indebtedness. Discharge of indebtedness income is "ordinary" in char-
acter, whereas if nonrecourse debt is included in a seller's amount realized, the character of such
depends on the asset sold or otherwise disposed of (e.g., such may be long term capital gain
receiving more preferential tax rate treatment).
64. Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
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cause no evidence was introduced that the lien on the property was
more than the property's value, and the buyer was willing to take the
property six and one-half years later, subject to the debt, and pay a
substantial amount of cash, the property must have had a fair market
value greater than the amount of debt at the time of the sale.65 Some
academics contend Mrs. Crane had no equity in the property whatso-
ever, and thus, the Crane rule applies to property valued equal to or
greater than the nonrecourse debt.66 Because the exception contained
in footnote 37 of the Crane opinion, discussed below, only applies to
debt in excess of the encumbered property's fair market value, it is
understandable why one would lean towards extending the Crane
holding to property of equal value. The problem with this interpreta-
tion, though, is that a seller has no economic interest in such a transac-
tion, as there is no equity, and therefore the Court's economic benefit
rationale fails under such circumstances.
A last ditch argument postured by Mrs. Crane's counsel was that
the gain from the transaction was not "income" within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because she did
not directly receive cash.67 This argument quickly fell apart, however,
as she claimed depreciation deductions on the building for nearly
seven years, making recapture justified.68 During this discussion, the
Court stated that it declined to answer whether a taxpayer would have
statutory or constitutional income if property were inherited subject
to debt in excess of fair market value, and the property were subse-
quently disposed of for cash boot while still subject to the mortgage.69
What is pertinent here, for our later discussion concerning corporate
distributions of excess debt property, is that the Court appears to be
implying that if Mrs. Crane had inherited the property with a date of
death value less than the nonrecourse debt, her basis would have been
limited to the property's fair market value. 70 By limiting basis to fair
market value at acquisition, a new issue arises, pivoting delicately on
65. Id. at 11-12.
66. See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 50, at 244 ("In fact, Mrs. Crane had no equity
to speak of in the property .....
67. See Crane, 331 U.S. at 15.
68, Id,
69. Id. at 15 n.42 ("In the course of the argument[,] some reference was made, as by analogy,
to a situation in which a taxpayer acquired by devise property subject to a mortgage in an
amount greater than the then value of the property, and later transferred it to a third person, still
subject to the mortgage, and for a cash boot. Whether or not the difference between the value of
the property on acquisition and the amount of the mortgage would in that situation constitute
either statutory or constitutional income is a question which is different from the one before us,
and which we need not presently answer.").
70. Id.
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whether or not after applying the Court's limitation the devisee would
have income on a later disposition of the property, particularly if the
full amount of nonrecourse debt is required to be included in the
amount realized. 71
IV. TUFTS AND THE MOST NOTORIOUS LEGAL
FOOTNOTE IN HISTORY
What the Crane court failed to adequately address, and left for the
case of Commissioner v. Tufts to resolve over thirty-five years later,
was whether or not nonrecourse debt should be included in a seller's
amount realized when the debt is in excess of the property's fair mar-
ket value.72 The Crane court reserved this question in footnote 37 of
its opinion as an apparent exception to the economic benefit analy-
sis. 73 For more than three decades after the Crane decision, the noto-
rious footnote spun unpredictably like a spring-loaded pifiata, stuffed
with unanswered questions exhaustively debated among academics
and practitioners. 74 It was as if each time a commentator took a swing
at the colorful footnote, additional unresolved legal issues would fall
out.75 Even the lower courts had issues with Crane's mysterious foot-
71. Id.
72. Crane, 331 U.S. at 14 n.37 ("Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount
of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the
mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor aban-
doned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not
this case.").
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., D. Nelson Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An
Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159 (1966); Louis A. Del Cotto, Basis and
Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects of Mortgage Financing, 118
U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1969); Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case,
33 TAX L. REV. 277 (1978); Daniel L. Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane Where
Are You Now?, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1979); Daniel L. Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Amount
Realized: The Demise of Crane's Footnote 37, 59 OR. L. REV. 3 (1980); Daniel L. Simmons, Tufts
v. Commissioner: Amount Realized Limited to Fair Market Value, 15 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 577
(1982); Jerold A. Friedland, Tufts and Millar: Two New Views of the Crane Case and Its Famous
Footnote, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510 (1982); Patricia A. Cain, From Crane to Tuft&- In Search
of a Rationale for the Taxation of Nonrecourse Mortgagors, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1982); John
A. Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1
(1982); Diane M. Anderson, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1498 (1982).
75. See, e.g., D. Nelson Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An
Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159 (1966); Louis A. Del Cotto, Basis and
Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects of Mortgage Financing, 118
U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1969); Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case,
33 TAX L. REV. 277 (1978); Daniel L. Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane Where
Are You Now?, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1979); Daniel L. Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Amount
Realized: The Demise of Crane's Footnote 37,59 OR. L. REV. 3 (1980); Daniel L. Simmons, Tufts
v. Commissioner: Amount Realized Limited to Fair Market Value, 15 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 577
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note reservation. 76 The U.S. Tax Court and Third Circuit Court of
Appeals simply refused to acknowledge the footnote's presence, con-
tending that doing so would defeat the spirit of the Crane holding.77
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand, decided to
abide by the footnote and ruled against the Commissioner, triggering
a divisive split among the circuits that launched the Tufts case to the
U.S. Supreme Court.78 It is important to keep in perspective that
Crane permitted taxpayers to include nonrecourse debt in basis, caus-
ing an entire cottage industry of tax shelter transactions to arise,
where taxpayers claimed depreciation deductions on nonrecourse
debt encumbered property.79 It was a win-win situation for taxpayers,
as they received immediate tax deductions with no economic risk of
loss, and if the value of the property fell below the amount of the
debt, they could argue such was not included in the amount realized.
At the time of the Tufts decision, taxpayers were dumping their once
high basis tax shelters that had become worth less than the encumber-
ing nonrecourse debt.80
(1982); Jerold A. Friedland, Tufts and Millar: Two New Views of the Crane Case and Its Famous
Footnote, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510 (1982); Patricia A. Cain, From Crane to Tuft&- In Search
of a Rationale for the Taxation of Nonrecourse Mortgagors, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1982); John
A. Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1
(1982); Diane M. Anderson, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1498 (1982).
76. See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 50, at 245 ("The loose end left dangling by
footnote 37 remained unresolved until Tufts. Prior to Tufts, most courts addressing the issue,
including the Tax Court and the Third Circuit, had refused to find that footnote 37 represented
an exception to the general principal of inclusion of debt in amount realized. Nevertheless, in
1981, the Fifth Circuit ruled against the government, and the resulting split in the Circuits
brought the issue back to the Supreme Court.").
77. See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 50, at 245.
78. See Cunningham & Cunningham, supra note 50, at 245.
79. Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REV. 277
(1978).
80. Angela Prendergast, The Crane Controversy Continues, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 731, 731-33
(1983) ("Although Crane is the foundation for tax law governing many real property transac-
tions, including many tax shelters, until Tufts[,] no court allowed the taxpayer to benefit from the
plain language of Crane's footnote 37 .... Relying on a footnote in Crane, in Tufts v. Commis-
sioner, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized an exception to the
general rule of inclusion. In Tufts, because the fair market value of property secured by a nonre-
course mortgage had declined, upon disposition of the property, the taxpayer received less than
the amount of the mortgage. The Fifth Circuit refused to include the entire amount of the non-
recourse mortgage in the amount realized even though the taxpayer had taken depreciation
deductions using a basis which included the nonrecourse mortgage. The court held that the
portion of a nonrecourse mortgage that must be included in the amount realized upon disposi-
tion of the property securing the mortgage is limited to the fair market value of the property.
The Tufts holding is in direct conflict with the earlier Third Circuit holding in Millar v. Commis-
sioner. [Millar v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).] The Millar court, under similar facts, included
the full amount of a nonrecourse mortgage in the amount realized.").
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The case of Commissioner v. Tufts was decided in 1983.81 The facts
involved a general partnership that was committed to constructing an
apartment complex. 82 The partnership had obtained a nonrecourse
loan in the amount of $1,851,500 in 1970 to construct the complex.83
The security for the loan was the apartment complex itself.84 Under
the rules of partnership taxation, the debt was collectively reflected in
the partners' respective outside bases.8 5 The primary asset of the part-
nership was the complex (subject to the nonrecourse debt).86 The
partners contributed very little in the way of capital contributions to
the venture.87 In fact, their total combined capital contributions only
equaled $44,212.88 In 1971, the apartment complex was completed. 89
The partners were allocated their respective items of loss and depreci-
ation deductions in the tax years 1971 and 1972.90 These deductions
totaled $439,972. 91 After adjusting the partners' bases upward for
their nominal capital contributions made and downward for the de-
ductions claimed, the collective outside bases of the partners in their
partnership interests (which was the partnership's inside basis in the
asset) equaled $1,455,740 in 1972.92
In 1971 and 1972, the city where the complex was located suffered a
severe economic decline. 93 As a direct consequence, the partnership's
rental income dropped and was significantly less than originally antici-
pated. 94 Without sufficient rental income, the partnership was unable
to make payments on the mortgage. 95 To avoid foreclosure, the part-
81. Tufts v. Comm'r, 461 U.S. 300, 301 (1983).
82. Id. at 302.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. I.R.C. § 752(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(b) (1991).
86. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 302.
87. See id. ("On August 1, 1970, respondent Clark Pelt, a builder, and his wholly owned cor-
poration, respondent Clark, Inc., formed a general partnership. The purpose of the partnership
was to construct a 120-unit apartment complex in Duncanville, Tex., a Dallas suburb. Neither
Pelt nor Clark, Inc., made any capital contribution to the partnership.... Pelt later admitted
four friends and relatives, respondents Tufts, Steger, Stephens, and Austin, as general partners.
None of them contributed capital upon entering the partnership. The construction of the com-
plex was completed in August 1971. During 1971, each partner made small capital contributions
to the partnership; in 1972, however, only Pelt made a contribution. The total of the partners'




91. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 302.
92. Id.
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ners sold their respective partnership interests to an unrelated third
party named Fred Bayles. 96 Mr. Bayles had agreed to assume the
nonrecourse mortgage, and reimburse each partner's sales expenses
up to $250. 9 7 On the date of the transfer, the property had a fair mar-
ket value of $1,400,000.98 After the sale, the partnership reported a
tax loss of $55,740, which was allocated to the partners. 99 The part-
nership's calculation of the loss was based on the difference between
the property's adjusted basis of $1,455,740 and $1,400,000, its fair mar-
ket value at the time of the sale. 100 As a result, not only did the part-
ners benefit from the depreciation deductions claimed against the
property's Crane debt basis, but they also incurred a loss on disposi-
tion of the complex - all with no genuine economic risk of loss.1° 1 The
Commissioner disagreed with the partnership's characterization of the
"amount realized," contending that the partnership really had a capi-
tal gain in the amount of $395,760.102 Under the Commissioner's the-
ory, the full amount of nonrecourse debt (i.e., $1,851,500) was
included in the partnership's amount realized, notwithstanding the
fact that it exceeded the property's fair market value. 10 3 It became
the perfect storm eagerly awaiting Supreme Court navigation. The
U.S. Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's deficiencies, while the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court, questioning
the theoretical underpinnings of the Crane decision.10 4
The Supreme Court in Tufts began by reciting Crane, and stating
that it was not inclined to overrule it.105 The Court asserted that
96. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303. The court states that Mr. Bayles "assumed" the mortgage but this is
a matter of phraseology, as he did not assume any personal exposure; the debt was nonrecourse.
He merely took the property subject to the mortgage. This article will discuss the issue of assum-
ing recourse debt and taking property subject to nonrecourse debt in greater detail infra.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. The partners did not claim their allocated portion of the loss from the sale of the
complex on their respective returns until they petitioned the Tax Court.
100. Id.
101. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 303.
102. See id.
103. Id. The court in footnote 2 acknowledges the total gain recognized was $395,760, but for
the purposes of the main text of the opinion, rounds the number off to $400,000.
104. Id. at 303-04.
105. Id. at 307 ("This case presents that unresolved issue. We are disinclined to overrule
Crane, and we conclude that the same rule applies when the unpaid amount of the nonrecourse
mortgage exceeds the value of the property transferred. Crane ultimately does not rest on its
limited theory of economic benefit; instead, we read Crane to have approved the Commis-
sioner's decision to treat a nonrecourse mortgage in this context as a true loan. This approval
underlies Crane's holdings that the amount of the nonrecourse liability is to be included in calcu-
lating both the basis and the amount realized on disposition. That the amount of the loan ex-
ceeds the fair market value of the property thus becomes irrelevant.").
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whether or not the unpaid amount of the mortgage exceeds the value
of the property transferred is irrelevant, as the Crane rule still ap-
plies.10 6 The Crane economic benefit analysis was then relegated to
mere dicta by the Tufts court.10 7 Any other conclusion would have
made the Tufts court a prisoner of footnote 37, leading to absurd and
abusive tax results.10 8 The Court stated, in pertinent part, "Crane ulti-
mately does not rest on its limited theory of economic benefit; instead,
we read Crane to have approved the Commissioner's decision to treat
a nonrecourse mortgage in this context as a true loan."'1 9 By holding
that nonrecourse debt should be included in the amount realized re-
gardless of the asset's fair market value, the court wedged its decision
squarely into Crane's functional relationship rationale. 110 The Court
maintained that when a taxpayer receives a loan, he incurs an obliga-
tion to repay that loan at some point in the future, and because of the
obligation to repay, the loan proceeds do not constitute income."'
Likewise, when the taxpayer repays the obligation, the transaction is
tax-neutral."12 Because the Crane court decided to include nonre-
course debt in a taxpayer's cost basis when it is "true debt," in the case
where the property is later sold or otherwise disposed of, the extin-
guishment of the mortgagor's obligation to repay justifies inclusion of
the debt in the taxpayer's amount realized. 1 3 Without such symmetri-
cal treatment, the taxpayer would be receiving the proceeds of the
nonrecourse loan tax-free via a Crane debt basis, as illustrated
above. 114




110. Id. at 313 ("Nothing in either § 1001(b) or in the Court's prior decisions requires the
Commissioner to permit a taxpayer to treat a sale of encumbered property asymmetrically, by
including the proceeds of the nonrecourse obligation in basis, but not accounting for the pro-
ceeds upon transfer of the encumbered property.").
111. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 308-09.
114. Id. at 309-10 ("The rationale for this treatment is that the original inclusion of the
amount of the mortgage in basis rested on the assumption that the mortgagor incurred an obliga-
tion to repay. Moreover, this treatment balances the fact that the mortgagor originally received
the proceeds of the nonrecourse loan tax-free on the same assumption. Unless the outstanding
amount of the mortgage is deemed to be realized, the mortgagor effectively will have received
untaxed income at the time the loan was extended and will have received an unwarranted in-
crease in the basis of his property.").
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V. CRANE AND TuFTs SYMMETRY IN CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS
The above Crane and Tufts discussion in the corporate context be-
gins by evaluating shareholder contributions of property subject to
nonrecourse debt, particularly excess debt property. Under § 351(a),
shareholders may contribute "property" to a controlled corporation
(without gain or loss recognition), so long as they receive "solely
stock" of the corporation in exchange. 115 While "control," for pur-
poses of § 351(a) is defined in § 368(c), 1 6 the term "property" is not
defined in the I.R.C. or regulations. The courts and the Internal Rev-
enue Service (the "Service"), however, have defined "property" to in-
clude just about any asset (e.g., intangibles, real property, accounts
receivable, inventory, money, etc.). In other words, the courts and the
Service have broadly interpreted the term to include any legally
owned asset that can be identified, valued, and transferred. 117 Ser-
vices and certain indebtedness of the controlled corporation (and ac-
crued interest) are specifically excluded from the definition of
property under § 351(d). 118 At the moment, § 351(a) and the regula-
tions do not distinguish between property worth more than its subject
debt and property worth less than its encumbering debt (i.e., excess
debt property)." 9 In other words, similar to Crane, an asset encum-
bered by debt is still considered "property," as debt has no bearing on
whether it is property.
For example, assume Mrs. Crane contributes an apartment building
with a fair market value of $175x (subject to $190x of nonrecourse
debt) into X Corporation in exchange for 10 shares of X Corporation
stock. Immediately after the exchange, X Corporation is solvent, and
Mrs. Crane owns all of X Corporation's stock. Under the current
rules, the exchange would qualify for § 351(a) nonrecognition. 120 This
115. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred to a
corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock in such corporation[,] and
immediately after the exchange[,] such person or persons are in control (as defined in section
368(c)) of the corporation.").
116. I.R.C. § 368(c) ("For purposes of part I (other than section 304), part II, this part, and
part V, the term "control" means the ownership of stock possessing at least 80[%] of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80[%] of the total
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.").
117. Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3rd Cir. 1974) ("We fail to
perceive any special reason why a restrictive meaning should be applied to accounts receivables
so as to exclude them from the general meaning of "property." Receivables possess the usual
capabilities and attributes associated with jurisprudential concepts of property law. They may be
identified, valued, and transferred.").
118. I.R.C. § 351(d).
119. I.R.C. § 351(a).
120. Id.
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is the case even though the property is clearly "underwater." The
Treasury, however, has proposed regulations that would treat the ex-
change as a taxable transaction. 121 The proposed regulations state
that if a shareholder transfers property without any net value, or the
transferee receives property without any net value, then the property
requirement of § 351(a) is not satisfied.122 Property has "net value"
when the fair market value of the transferred property exceeds the
sum of the amount of liabilities of the transferor assumed by the trans-
feree, and any boot received by the transferor in connection with the
exchange. 123 As stated previously, this net value limitation on prop-
erty is strikingly similar to the taxpayer's argument set forth in
Crane.124 Substantively, Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.351-
1(a)(iii) provides that if property does not have net value in the trans-
feror and transferee's hands, it is not "property" for the purposes of
§ 351(a). 125 Recall that Mrs. Crane made a similar argument (albeit
under a different statutory section); namely, that property was limited
to equity. The Court, however, stated that if the legislature wanted to
use the word "equity," they would have. 126 The same logic should
arguably apply when interpreting § 351(a), and thus, the Treasury
might be exceeding its congressionally delegated authority here with
the proposed regulation.
In sum, to avoid recognition of gain or loss, a transferor must: (1)
transfer property, (2) be in control immediately thereafter, and (3)
121. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(2), Ex. 4 (1996) ("A, an individual, transfers an apartment
building with a fair market value of $175x to Corporation X. The building is subject to a nonre-
course obligation of $190x and no other asset is subject to that liability. A receives 10 shares of
Corporation X stock in the exchange. Immediately after the exchange, Corporation X is solvent
and A owns 100% of its outstanding stock. Under paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section, the 10
shares of Corporation X stock received by A will not be treated as issued for property because
the fair market value of the apartment building does not exceed the amount of A's liabilities
assumed by Corporation X. Therefore, section 351 does not apply to the exchange.").
122. Id. at (a)(1)(iii) ("Stock will not be treated as issued for property if either - (A) The fair
market value of the transferred property does not exceed the sum of the amount of liabilities of
the transferor that are assumed by the transferee in connection with the transfer and the amount
of any money and the fair market value of any other property (other than stock permitted to be
received under section 351(a) without the recognition of gain) received by the transferor in con-
nection with the transfer. For this purpose, any obligation of the transferor for which the trans-
feree is the obligee that is extinguished for federal income tax purposes in connection with the
transfer is treated as a liability assumed by the transferee; or (B) The fair market value of the
assets of the transferee does not exceed the amount of its liabilities immediately after the trans-
fer ....").
123. Id.
124. See Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1947).
125. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(iii) (1996).
126. See Crane, 331 U.S. at 8.
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receive solely stock of the transferee corporation.127 If the share-
holder receives any property other than "solely stock" of the trans-
feree corporation (including nonqualified preferred stock) in
exchange for the transferor's property, the property is considered
"boot." 128 The receipt of boot may trigger the recognition of gain (but
not loss) in an amount equal to the lesser of the transferor's realized
gain or the fair market value of the boot property received.129 Under
certain nonrecognition provisions in the Code, such as §§ 1031, 1035,
and 1036, a transferor's relief from liabilities is considered the func-
tional equivalent of the receipt of boot.130 The issue under § 351(a) is
whether or not a transferee corporation's assumption of debt is
treated as boot received by the transferor. 131 Generally speaking,
when a corporation assumes the liability of a transferor, § 357(a) pro-
vides that the assumption of such liability shall not be considered boot
for the purposes of determining gain recognition. 132 Section 357(d)
then specifies which rules are used for evaluating whether or not a
liability is considered "assumed" by the transferee for the application
of § 357.133 Section 357(d) was enacted by Congress because it was
concerned that taxpayers were taking advantage of § 357 when debt
was secured by more than one asset, in which case, taxpayers would
transfer assets to multiple entities in an attempt to count debt basis
127. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006).
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-2(a) (2000) ("If an exchange would be within the provisions of sec-
tion 351(a) if it were not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not only of
property permitted by such subsection to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of
other property or money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an
amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property.
No loss to the recipient shall be recognized.").
129. I.R.C. § 351(b).
130. See I.R.C. § 1031 (involving nontaxable like kind exchanges of property held for produc-
tive use in a trade or business or for investment); I.R.C. § 1035 (involving certain exchanges of
insurance policies); I.R.C. § 1036 (dealing with stock-for-stock exchanges of stock of the same
corporation).
131. I.R.C. § 351(b).
132. I.R.C. § 357(a).
133. I.R.C. § 357(d). Section 357(d) treats a recourse liability as being assumed to the extent
the transferee corporation agrees to assume the liability. A transferee corporation is only
treated as having assumed a recourse liability when based on the facts and circumstances the
transferee has agreed to and is expected to satisfy the debt (or any portion thereof) whether or
not the transferor shareholder is relieved of the liabilities. Therefore the transferee corporation
must expressly agree to the assumption of recourse debt. Nonrecourse liabilities on the other
hand are generally treated as "assumed" to the extent the transferred assets are "subject to" the
nonrecourse debt. Id. Under section 357(d)(2) the amount of nonrecourse liability considered
assumed is reduced by the lesser of: (A) the amount of the liability that the transferor share-
holder agrees to (and is expected to) satisfy or (B) the fair market value of the other assets
securing the nonrecourse debt. Id. § 357(d)(2).
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more than once. 134 "Recourse debt" is considered assumed under
§ 357(d) only to the extent that the transferee corporation agrees to
(and is expected to) satisfy the liability.135 Whereas, "nonrecourse
debt" is considered assumed to the extent the transferred asset is
"subject to" the debt. 136 Currently, the Treasury is contemplating pro-
posing regulations that would align the nonrecourse debt rules more
closely with those of recourse debt, so that agreements between the
transferee and transferor would be considered. 37
To illustrate § 357(a), assume Mrs. Crane acquires a depreciable as-
set for $100x. The purchase price consists of $10x cash and $90x in
nonrecourse debt secured by the asset. Under Crane principles, her
cost basis is $100x, which includes $90x of debt basis. Assume inter-
est-only is required on the promissory note and Mrs. Crane depreci-
ates the asset by $5x. At a time when the asset has a fair market value
of $120x and an adjusted basis of $95x Mrs. Crane contributes it (sub-
ject to the $90x of nonrecourse debt) to X Corporation in exchange
for 100 shares of X Corporation (out of 300 outstanding). The 100
shares are collectively valued at $30x (i.e., the net contribution
amount). Pursuant to a prearranged plan of incorporation, sharehold-
ers Z and Y each transfer $30x cash in exchange for 100 shares each.
The control and property requirements of § 351(a) are satisfied.138
Per Crane and Tufts, Mrs. Crane's amount realized in the exchange
includes the full amount of nonrecourse debt the transferred asset is
subject to. 139 Mrs. Crane's realized gain in from the exchange is $25x
(i.e., $30x + $90x - $95x). Fortunately for Mrs. Crane, the general rule
of § 357(a) applies, and the transferee's assumption of the debt will
not be considered boot for the purposes of gain "recognition" under
§ 351(a). 140 X Corporation's assumption is treated as boot, however,
134. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 105TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET PROPOSAL (Comm. Print 1998).
135. I.R.C. § 357(d)(1)(A).
136. I.R.C. § 357(d)(1)(B).
137. I.R.S. Announcement 2003-37, 2003-1 C.B. 1025.
138. I.R.C. § 351(a). The shareholders transferred property in exchange for stock of the cor-
poration and they have control immediately after the exchange (i.e., 100%). Id.
139. Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) ("When a taxpayer sells or disposes of prop-
erty encumbered by a nonrecourse obligation, the Commissioner properly requires him to in-
clude among the assets realized the outstanding amount of the obligation. The fair market value
of the property is irrelevant to this calculation.").
140. I.R.C. § 357(a) ("Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), if - (1) the taxpayer
receives property which would be permitted to be received under section 351 or section 361
without the recognition of gain if it were the sole consideration, and (2) as part of the considera-
tion, another party to the exchange assumes a liability of the taxpayer, then such assumption
shall not be treated as money or other property, and shall not prevent the exchange from being
within the provisions of section 351 or 361 as the case may be.").
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for the purposes of determining Mrs. Crane's stock basis in the shares
received (i.e., it reduces her stock basis). 141 The assumption of debt is
also considered boot when calculating her "realized" gain (i.e., it in-
creases her amount realized and thus her realized gain). 142 As a re-
sult, Mrs. Crane would "realize" $25x of gain, but would not recognize
any gain.143 After the exchange, her stock basis would be $5x (i.e.,
$95x - $90x).
Notice how the inclusion of the nonrecourse debt above in Mrs.
Crane's amount realized is consistent with the "functional relation-
ship" discussion in Crane and Tufts. In other words, the inclusion of
the debt in her asset basis warranted such in her amount realized. The
fact that she does not recognize any gain in the exchange is neverthe-
less consistent with Crane and Tufts, as the Service is returned its orig-
inal $90x of tax-free debt basis from Mrs. Crane when her stock basis
was correspondingly reduced by a like amount. Put another way, the
tax-free receipt of $90x of debt basis, fully offset $90x of realized gain
resulting in a tax-neutral transaction. This is identical to receiving
$90x of loan proceeds tax-free and repaying the lender in full at a
future point in time.
There are two exceptions, however, to the general rule of § 357(a)
contained in subsections (b) and (C).1 44 Subsection (b) of § 357 in-
volves transfers where the assumption is part of a "tax avoidance pur-
pose," or there is no "bona fide business purpose" for the
assumption. 145 The burden is on the transferor to prove that the as-
sumption was not part of a tax avoidance transaction and there was a
bona fide business purpose.146 In determining tax avoidance, courts
and the Service will generally look at the length of time between the
141. I.R.C. § 358(a)(1)(A). Under this statutory section, when an exchange qualifies for
§ 351, the transferor shareholder's stock basis is generally equal to the adjusted basis of the
property transferred, plus any gain recognized by the transferor minus the fair market value of
boot received by the transferee corporation (which includes any money received and debt
assumed).
142. I.R.C. § 358(d)(1).
143. Treas. Reg. § 1.357-1(a) (as amended in 1961) ("Section 357(a) does not affect the rule
that liabilities assumed are to be taken into account for the purpose of computing the amount of
gain or loss realized under section 1001 upon an exchange.").
144. I.R.C. § 357.
145. I.R.C. § 357(b)(1) ("If, taking into consideration the nature of the liability and the cir-
cumstances in the light of which the arrangement for the assumption was made, it appears that
the principal purpose of the taxpayer with respect to the assumption described in subsection (a)
- (A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the exchange, or (B) if not such purpose,
was not a bona fide business purpose, then such assumption (in the total amount of the liability
assumed pursuant to such exchange) shall, for purposes of section 351 or 361 (as the case may
be), be considered as money received by the taxpayer on the exchange.").
146. I.R.C. § 357(b)(2).
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taxpayer's incurrence of the debt and the assumption by the corpora-
tion. The closer in time, the more likely tax avoidance has occurred.
A business purpose exists when the liabilities assumed are associated
with the business, and it does not exist when the debts are personal in
nature (e.g., home mortgage, credit card obligations, car loans, etc.).
Without such a rule taxpayers could easily avoid boot recognition by
incurring debt shortly before the exchange.
To demonstrate, assume Mrs. Crane owns an asset with a fair mar-
ket value of $100x and an adjusted basis of $50x. She would like to
exchange said asset for X Corporation stock under § 351(a). She
would also like $20x of cash, but she prefers not to sell the asset to an
unrelated third party. One planning scenario, would be for Mrs.
Crane to contribute the asset into the corporation and receive in the
exchange $20x in cash along with X Corporation stock. The cash re-
ceived, however, would be considered boot and she would recognize
$20x of gain (i.e., the lesser of $20x boot or $50x realized gain). To
avoid this harsh result, she may take out $20x of debt secured by the
asset shortly before the exchange, pocket the loan proceeds, and point
to the general rule of § 357(a) for nonrecognition. Under these cir-
cumstances, her realized gain would be $50x ($80x + $20x - $50x),
none of which would be recognized under § 357(a). 147 However,
§ 357(b) would then step in to disallow this tax avoidance transac-
tion.148 As a result, the assumed debt would be treated the same as
receiving $20x cash outright from X Corporation, all of which she
would recognize just as in the first scenario. In preventing this tax
avoidance transaction, § 357(b) taints "all" liabilities as boot (i.e., not
just those incurred for a tax avoidance or non-business purpose). 149
The character of Mrs. Crane's recognized gain would be determined
by looking at the character of the asset transferred.
The final exception to § 357(a) is subsection (c).150 This subsection
provides that the transferor recognizes gain under § 351(a) to the ex-
147. I.R.C. § 357(a).
148. Treas. Reg. § 1.357-1(c) (as amended in 1961) ("The benefits of section 357(a) do not
extend to any exchange involving an assumption of liabilities where it appears that the principal
purpose of the taxpayer with respect to such assumption was to avoid Federal income tax on the
exchange, or, if not such purpose, was not a bona fide business purpose...").
149. Id. ("In such cases, the total amount of liabilities assumed or acquired pursuant to such
exchange (and not merely a particular liability with respect to which the tax avoidance purpose
existed) shall, for the purpose of determining the amount of gain to be recognized upon the
exchange in which the liabilities are assumed or acquired, be treated as money received by the
taxpayer upon the exchange.").
150. I.R.C. § 357(c)(1) ("In the case of an exchange - (A) to which section 351 applies, or (B)
to which section 361 applies by reason of a plan of reorganization within the meaning of section
368(a)(1)(D) with respect to which stock or securities of the corporation to which the assets are
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tent that the liabilities assumed exceed the total adjusted bases of the
assets transferred. 151 Again, the character of any recognized gain
would vary depending on the assets transferred. 152 Unlike § 357(b),
however, § 357(c) is not a "boot rule," in that, if the rule is triggered
gain is recognized regardless of whether or not there is any realized
gain.153 Section 357(c) is also distinguishable from § 357(b), because
only the excess debt over the adjusted bases of the assets transferred
is recognized; 154 whereas, if § 357(b) applies, all liabilities are tainted
as boot received in the exchange. 155
To illustrate, assume Mrs. Crane claimed depreciation deductions
totaling $15x (rather than $5x) in the first example where the asset
previously had a cost basis of $100x. Under these circumstances, her
adjusted basis would be $85x. Further assume that she transfers the
asset into X Corporation when its fair market value is $120x in ex-
change for 100 shares. The asset is also subject to $90x of nonrecourse
debt. Accordingly, Mrs. Crane's amount realized would be $120x (i.e.,
$30x + $90x) and her realized gain would be $35x ($120x - $85x).
Under § 357(c) she would recognize $5x of gain (i.e., the amount of
debt in excess of basis).'5 6 The logic behind this rule is twofold: (1) to
avoid negative basis to the transferor shareholder, and (2) to allow the
transferor to receive a Crane and Tufts-like benefit when relieved of
liabilities in excess of basis which must be properly accounted for (i.e.,
the taxpayer previously received tax-free debt basis).
The negative basis phenomenon is easily illustrated. If the general
rule of § 357(a) applied without the exception, Mrs. Crane's stock ba-
sis at the conclusion of the transaction would be negative $5x (i.e.,
$85x - $90x). The Code, however, does not permit negative basis, so
§ 357(c) steps in to prevent this result triggering recognition of $5x of
gain. Therefore, Mrs. Crane's stock basis at the conclusion of the ex-
change is zero (i.e., $85x + $5x - $90x). This result is consistent with
both Crane and Tufts, as Mrs. Crane received tax-free debt basis of
$90x and was permitted to claim $5x of tax depreciation against it,
which offset her income. Without such a rule, Mrs. Crane's $5x tax-
transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under section 355, if the sum of the
amount of the liabilities assumed exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the property trans-
ferred pursuant to such exchange, then such excess shall be considered as a gain from the sale or
exchange of a capital asset or of property which is not a capital asset, as the case may be.").
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2(a) (as amended in 1980).
152. Id.
153. I.R.C. § 357(c)(1) (2006).
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.357-1(c) (as amended in 1961).
155. Id.
156. I.R.C. § 357(c).
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free receipt of income would forever escape taxation - an absurd re-
sult § 357(c) is specifically designed to prevent.
On the transferee corporation's side, under § 1032(a) the corpora-
tion recognizes no gain or loss when it exchanges its own stock for
money or property.157 This rule applies regardless of whether or not
§ 351(a) is satisfied by the transferor shareholders. 158 The corporation
also does not recognize gain or loss upon the receipt of services for its
stock, as services are treated as a contribution of property or money
under § 1032(a). 159 With regard to "capital contributions" of money
or property by shareholders, the receipt of such is excluded from the
corporation's gross income under § 118(a). 160 Shareholders making
these voluntary pro-rata capital contributions also recognize no gain
or loss, because they are not contributing anything in "exchange" for
stock (or boot).161 They are merely paying more for their respective
shares already owned. 162 If an exchange qualifies for nonrecognition
under § 351(a), or if shareholders make voluntary pro-rata capital
contributions, the corporation's basis in the assets received is gov-
erned by § 362.163 If, on the other hand, the exchange fails to qualify
for nonrecognition, the corporation receives a cost basis in the assets
under § 1012(a). 164
157. I.R.C. § 1032(a) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of
money or other property in exchange for stock (including treasury stock) of such corporation.
No gain or loss shall be recognized by a corporation with respect to any lapse or acquisition of an
option, or with respect to a securities futures contract (as defined in section 1234B), to buy or
sell its stock (including treasury stock).").
158. Id.
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(a) ("A transfer by a corporation of shares of its own stock (includ-
ing treasury stock) as compensation for services is considered, for purposes of section 1032(a), as
a disposition by the corporation of such shares for money or other property.").
160. I.R.C. § 118(a) ("In the case of a corporation, gross income does not include any contri-
bution to the capital of the taxpayer.").
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 ("In the case of a corporation, section 118 provides an exclusion
from gross income with respect to any contribution of money or property to the capital of the
taxpayer. Thus, if a corporation requires additional funds for conducting its business and obtains
such funds through voluntary pro rata payments by its shareholders, the amounts so received
being credited to its surplus account or to a special account, such amounts do not constitute
income, although there is no increase in the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation. In
such a case the payments are in the nature of assessments upon, and represent an additional
price paid for, the shares of stock held by the individual shareholders, and will be treated as an
addition to and as a part of the operating capital of the company.").
162. Id.
163. I.R.C. § 1032(b) ("For basis of property acquired by a corporation in certain exchanges
for its stock, see section 362."); I.R.C. § 351(h)(2) ("For the basis of stock or property received in
an exchange to which this section applies, see sections 358 and 362.").
164. I.R.C. § 1012(a) ("The basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except as
otherwise provided in this subchapter and subchapters C (relating to corporate distributions and
adjustments), K (relating to partners and partnerships), and P (relating to capital gains and
losses).").
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Section 362(a) provides a corporation receives a transferred basis in
the assets received, increased by any gain recognized by the trans-
feror.165 Section 362(d), however, limits the corporation's increase in
basis to the fair market value of the property received (determined
without regard to § 7701(g)) as a result of any gain recognized by the
transferor attributable to the corporation's assumption of liabilities. 166
Section 7701(g) was enacted after Tufts in 1984, codifying the Su-
preme Court's holding.167 Section 7701(g) provides a "clarification"
to the Code's determination of "fair market value" as applied to Sub-
title A of the Code (Income Taxes) when debt is involved. 168 It states,
in pertinent part, "in determining the amount of gain or loss (or
deemed gain or loss) with respect to any property, the fair market
value of such property shall be treated as being not less than the
amount of any nonrecourse indebtedness to which such property is
subject."'1 69 The legislative history of this particular subsection indi-
cates it was intended to reaffirm the Tufts holding that the entire non-
recourse liability is to be included in the amount realized regardless of
the fair market value of the property sold or otherwise disposed of. 170
Section 7701(g) was enacted several years after Treasury Regulation
§ 1.1001-2(b), which had already specified that the full amount of lia-
bilities are to be included in the amount realized upon a sale or dispo-
sition, regardless of the fair market value of the secured asset.171 The
Treasury issued Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-2(b) while Tufts was be-
165. I.R.C. § 362(a) ("If property was acquired on or after June 22, 1954, by a corporation -
(1) in connection with a transaction to which section 351 (relating to transfer of property to
corporation controlled by transferor) applies, or (2) as paid-in surplus or as a contribution to
capital, then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the transferor, increased in
the amount of gain recognized to the transferor on such transfer.").
166. I.R.C. § 362(d)(1) ("In no event shall the basis of any property be increased under sub-
section (a) or (b) above the fair market value of such property (determined without regard to
section 7701(g)) by reason of any gain recognized to the transferor as a result of the assumption
of a liability.").
167. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 75(c), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 595.
168. I.R.C. § 7701(g).
169. Id.
170. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG. 2ND SESS., GENERAL EXPLANA-
TION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 239 (Joint Comm.
Print 1984).
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(b) (1980) ("The fair market value of the security at the time of
sale or disposition is not relevant for purposes of determining under paragraph (a) of this section
the amount of liabilities from which the taxpayer is discharged or treated as discharged. Thus,
the fact that the fair market value of the property is less than the amount of the liabilities it
secures does not prevent the full amount of those liabilities from being treated as money re-
ceived from the sale or other disposition of the property.").
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ing litigated. 172 The regulation applies to any "sale or disposition" of
property, and a disposition of property includes a transfer of property
in satisfaction of liabilities to which it is subject. 173 The regulation
specifically excludes from its application contributions and distribu-
tions in the partnership context, but not in the corporate context.
174
The regulation also contains limiting language on the Tufts inclusion
rule, stating, "In the case of a liability incurred by reason of the acqui-
sition of the property, this section does not apply to the extent that
such liability was not taken into account in determining the trans-
feror's basis for such property. ' 175 When enacting § 7701(g), Con-
gress did not specify whether the new provision modified the results in
any way obtained under this regulation.176 Put another way, it is un-
clear whether § 7701(g) requires inclusion of all nonrecourse liabilities
in the amount realized upon disposition of debt property, or just that
amount of debt originally included in the property's basis at
acquisition. 177
To illustrate the above discussion, assume Mrs. Crane transfers
property with a fair market value of $100x and adjusted basis of $40x
into X Corporation in exchange for X Corporation stock. The prop-
erty is subject to nonrecourse debt of $120x. Further assume the re-
quirements of § 351(a) are satisfied. 178 Under § 357(c) the transferred
property's debt is in excess of its adjusted basis by $80x. 179 Mrs. Crane
thus recognizes $80x of gain on the exchange. 180 Her stock basis is $Ox
(i.e., $40x + $80x - $120x). X Corporation's basis in the transferred
property is limited to the property's fair market value of $100x, not-
withstanding the nonrecourse debt of $120x assumed. This is because
X Corporation received a transferred basis of $40x under § 362(a)(2),
which was then increased by the $80x of gain recognized by the trans-
feror, however, such was limited to the property's fair market value of
$100x under § 362(d)(1). 181
If one week later, X Corporation disposes of the property through
foreclosure (or sells the property to another party for nothing more
172. Daniel S. Goldberg, Nonrecourse Debt in Excess of Fair Market Value: The Confluence of
Basis, Realization, Subchapter K and The Need for Consistency, 51 TAX LAW. 41, 45 (1997).
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(iii) (1980).
174. Id. at (a)(4)(iv).
175. Id. at (a)(3).
176. H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 864 (1984) (Conf. Rept.).
177. John S. Pennell, An Analysis of the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions Affecting Partner-
ships: Part II, 61 J. TAX'N 378, 383 (1984).
178. I.R.C. § 351(a) (2006).
179. I.R.C. § 357(c).
180. Id.
181. I.R.C. § 362(d)(1).
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than assumption of the debt), X Corporation's amount realized would
be $100x under the above quoted treasury regulation. 8 2 If, on the
other hand, § 7701(g) is interpreted blindly, or as a modification to the
regulation, X Corporation's amount realized would include the full
amount of the nonrecourse debt (i.e., $120x).183 Thus, X Corporation
would recognize and realize $20x of phantom gain (i.e., $120x - $100x)
that it did not economically sustain. 184 The Code and the regulations,
however, should be interpreted consistently when possible, in a man-
ner that adheres to the basic "tax logic" discussed in Crane and
Tufts. 85 Tax logic that requires symmetrical treatment of nonre-
course debt in a taxpayer's basis and amount realized to ensuring tax-
free basis is properly accounted for, and no more. The above regula-
tion is consistent with this tax logic, as a taxpayer should only have a
"tax gain" to the extent the taxpayer benefited economically with tax-
free debt basis.'8 6 Subjecting a taxpayer to a tax on fictitious gain,
where no tax-free receipt of income occurred, would defy elementary
tax logic and produce illogical results. This is the same absurd unsym-
metrical result that Crane and Tufts sought to avoid. Section 7701(g)
should therefore be read uniformly with the treasury regulation to
produce the correct dynamic relationship between basis and amount
realized.' 87 Simply put, if the debt was not included X Corporation's
basis at acquisition, it should not be included in X Corporation's
amount realized at disposition. 188 Unlike the taxpayers in Tufts, X
Corporation did not receive the benefit of "tax-free" basis to the ex-
tent § 362(d)(1) limited the transferred asset's basis to its fair market
value. 189 As a consequence, X Corporation should have no Crane or
Tufts obligation to include such in its amount realized. 190
182. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3) (1980).
183. I.R.C. § 7701(g).
184. Id.
185. Goldberg, supra note 172, at 75 ("Tax logic, then, requires that 'basis,' a term of art in the
tax law, should be interpreted with the ultimate goal of ensuring that a taxpayer's economic gain
should be accounted for as gain subject to tax, but that no more than the taxpayer's economic
gain should be subject to tax.").
186. Goldberg, supra note 172, at 76 ("The Supreme Court's analysis and result in Tufts are
consistent with this tax logic and, indeed, are grounded in it. The regulations' treatment of liabil-
ities that are excluded from basis when excess liability property is purchased and the exclusion of
those liabilities from amount realized when such property is sold represents another example of
adherence to tax logic.").
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3) (1980).
188. Id.
189. I.R.C. § 362(d)(1).
190. Section 362 contains three additional limitations to a corporation's transferred basis that
are outside the scope of this discussion.
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As mentioned previously, some academics have alleged that the
purchaser's basis in Tufts could have been one of three possibilities:
(1) zero, (2) fair market value, or (3) the full amount of nonrecourse
debt. In the corporate context, the statutory limitation of § 362(d)(1)
is most analogous to Professor Marvin Chirelstein's fair market value
basis position. 191 Professor Chirelstein contends that where a pur-
chaser acquires property, subject to nonrecourse debt and exceeding
the property's fair market value, the purchaser's basis should be lim-
ited to the property's fair market value. 192 Although X Corporation
does not acquire the transferred property in a purchase transaction,
the same principle nevertheless should apply; namely, "no one would
be willing to pay more for property, or borrow more to buy it, than
the property was actually worth."'1 93 An arm's-length buyer should be
acquiring property at a "cost" that reflects fair market value, and the
buyer's basis should not exceed such.194 The same holds true for X
Corporation: it should not be exchanging its stock for nonrecourse
debt property, or receiving capital contributions of such, at a cost
greater than fair market value. Unlike the purchaser in Tufts, how-
ever, a transferee corporation under § 362(d)(1) is expressly prohib-
ited by statute from acquiring a basis greater than the fair market
value of the excess debt property.195 Acquiring a basis in excess debt
property in excess of fair market value is therefore simply not an op-
tion in the context of contributions to corporations.
On the other hand, a transferee corporation receiving a zero basis
in a transferred asset arguably is possible, if the debt assumed is a
"contingent liability," and not "true debt" as required in Tufts. The
pivotal case that set forth the general rule for determining whether or
not debt is true debt, and thus should be included in basis, is the U.S.
Tax Court case of Mayerson v. Commissioner.196 Mayerson, while dis-
cussing the principles of Crane, held that purchase money nonre-
course debt should be included in basis, "since it can be assumed that
191. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 261 ("Pretty clearly.., where the property is known to be
worth less than the non-recourse debt at the time the property is acquired, the purchaser's basis
should be limited to the lower value figure.").
192. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 261.
193. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 261.
194. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 261.
195. Transferee corporations are also required to reduce the bases of transferred assets under
§ 362(e) when the transferor's collective bases of the assets transferred exceeds the transferor's
collective fair market value in the transferred assets. An election can be made, however, to
reduce the stock basis of the transferor, rather than the entity's bases. The rules of § 362(e)
prevent the importation of built-in losses. Otherwise, shareholders could "double up" on their
losses at the shareholder and entity level.
196. Mayerson v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 340, 352 (1966).
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a capital investment in the amount of the mortgage will eventually
occur despite the absence of personal liability. ' 197 Whereas, obliga-
tions that are "contingent" or "indefinite" in nature are excluded from
basis. 198 A later case entailing a further expansion of the contingent
debt analysis, was Gibson Products Co. v. United States, which held
when liabilities are "excessively contingent" they are not "true liabili-
ties" and thereby should not be included in one's cost basis. 199 As is
recalled from Tufts, the court specifically couched the Crane debt ba-
sis holding on its true debt nature. The Gibson court stated, among
other things:
[I]n a true lending transaction, there exists the reasonable likeli-
hood that the lender will be repaid in light of all reasonably foresee-
able risks. In other words, there must be 'a reasonable basis for the
prediction that the ability of the borrower to repay will not be
wholly or substantially contingent upon the success or failure of the
business venture.' 2°°
The court further stated, "[i]n a true lending transaction, the borrower
normally possesses assets nearly equal or greater in value than the
amount of indebtedness, whether or not those assets are hypothecated
to secure the debt. '20 1 A number of cases and rulings have ruled in a
similar fashion.2 02 True debt issues with nonrecourse debt also arise in
seller-financed and related party transactions, where the parties inten-
197. Id.
198. Id. at 353:
An example of the type of contingency referred to in the preceding proposition was
present in the Albany Car Wheel Co. case. In that case we found that the purchaser-
taxpayer's obligation under the purchase agreement to procure a release of the prede-
cessor's liability under a union contract for severance pay was of such a contingent
nature that it could not be considered a part of the cost of the assets acquired. Whether
it would ever be necessary to satisfy any severance pay obligations was unknown at the
time of the sale. Similarly, in the Lloyd H. Redford case the amount of a note was held
not to be includable in basis since the note was only payable from profits and it was
uncertain whether there would ever be profits. It was held in the Columbus & Green-
ville Railway Co. case that basis did not include any amount of a mortgage where there
was no primary responsibility and no fixed indebtedness for which the taxpayer or its
property was liable.
199. Gibson Prod. Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 1041, 1052 (1981).
200. Id. at 1047.
201. Id. at 1046.
202. Albany Car Wheel Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 831 (1963) (basis of properties subject to
mortgage reduced because obligations were too contingent); Redford v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 773
(1957) (cost of property received in assuming lease obligations too contingent for present valua-
tion); Rev. Rul. 80-235, 1980-2 C.B. 299 (nonrecourse obligation could not be included in basis
because movie proceeds too contingent to repay debt); Rev. Rul. 55-675, 1955-2 C.B. 567 (tax-
payer's cost basis was reduced because taxpayer's obligation to pay employee's severance pay
was too contingent).
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tionally attempt to inflate the purchase price to obtain a higher cost
basis.203
In the corporate context, the same true debt discussion should con-
tinue to apply. This means that if a shareholder transfers an asset sub-
ject to a contingent liability into a corporation, the liability under
§ 362(a) should not be part of the transferee corporation's basis in the
asset; in which case, the asset's basis attributable to the debt is zero.
This again is consistent with Crane and Tufts. As a result, there also
should be no gain recognized at the shareholder level under § 357(b)
and (c), because the contingent debt is not taken into account. Al-
though, it is plausible the Service could argue the debt had a "tax
avoidance purpose," and thus shareholder level recognition occurs.20 4
If continent debt is not taken into account, it should also not reduce
the shareholder's stock basis under §§ 357(a) and 358(d). If the con-
tingent debt is later repaid, however, or if it transforms itself into a
"true loan," a number of unanswered questions arise.20 5 With most
corporate contributions, though, contingent debt is unlikely, because
of the recognition scare of § 357(b), expressly prohibiting tax avoid-
ance debt and non-business debt. Moreover, contingent debt incurred
by a shareholder as a debtor should not be reflected in the asset's
basis anyway under the above rules. In which case, there is no debt
basis attributable to the contingent debt transferring to the corpora-
tion under § 362(a)(2).
VI. CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS OF CRANE AND TuFrs PROPERTY
Regardless of how a corporation acquires excess debt property,
Crane and Tufts issues spark again when the corporation decides to
distribute such property to its shareholders. Excess debt property
may be distributed to a shareholder in a "nonliquidating distribution"
under § 301.206 A corporation may also distribute such property in a
"liquidating distribution" under § 331.207 Section 332 also contains a
set of rules (not discussed herein) that apply when a subsidiary liqui-
203. Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045, 1049 (1976) ("For debt to exist, the pur-
chaser, in the absence of personal liability, must confront a situation in which it is presently
reasonable from an economic point of view for him to make a capital investment in the amount
of the unpaid purchase price.").
204. BORIS I. BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 3.06 (7th ed. 2000).
205. Id. (For example, was the assumption of debt for tax avoidance purposes under § 357(b),
does § 357(c) apply, is the transferor's stock basis reduced under § 358(d), does the transferee
increase its basis, etc.?).
206. I.R.C. § 301 (2006).
207. I.R.C. § 331.
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dates into its parent, providing nonrecognition to the two affiliated
corporations.20 8 A liquidating distribution occurs when a corporation
(in the status of liquidation) makes one or a series of distributions in
complete cancellation or redemption of its stock.209 A corporation is
in the "status of liquidation" when it ceases to be a going concern and
is merely winding up its affairs, paying debts and divesting itself of its
assets.21 0 Whether a distribution of property is a liquidating or nonliq-
uidating distribution can affect, among other things, whether the
transferor corporation is permitted to recognize losses, the amount
and character of the gain recognized by the shareholder, and whether
the shareholder recognizes a loss.
When a corporation decides to make a nonliquidating distribution
to a shareholder, under § 311(b)(1), if the property is appreciated, it
will recognize gain (but not loss) as if it sold the property at its fair
market value to the distributee shareholder. 211 Under § 311(b)(2), if
the distributed property is subject to a liability, the rules of § 336(b)
apply.212 Section 336(b) (which also applies to liquidating distribu-
tions) states that if the distributed property is subject to a liability, or
the shareholder assumes the liability, the fair market value of the dis-
208. I.R.C. § 332.
209. Although there is no definition of the term "liquidation" in the Code, the regulations for
§ 332 make an attempt at defining it (which can be equally applied to § 331). Cf. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.332-2(c) (1960):
"To constitute a distribution in complete liquidation within the meaning of section 332,
the distribution must be (1) made by the liquidating corporation in complete cancella-
tion or redemption of all of its stock in accordance with a plan of liquidation, or (2) one
of a series of distributions in complete cancellation or redemption of all its stock in
accordance with a plan of liquidation. Where there is more than one distribution, it is
essential that a status of liquidation exist at the time the first distribution is made under
the plan and that such status continue until the liquidation is completed. Liquidation is
completed when the liquidating corporation and the receiver or trustees in liquidation
are finally divested of all the property (both tangible and intangible). A status of liqui-
dation exists when the corporation ceases to be a going concern and its activities are
merely for the purpose of winding up its affairs, paying its debts, and distributing any
remaining balance to its shareholders. A liquidation may be completed prior to the
actual dissolution of the liquidating corporation. However, legal dissolution of the cor-
poration is not required. Nor will the mere retention of a nominal amount of assets for
the sole purpose of preserving the corporation's legal existence disqualify the
transaction.
210. Id.
211. I.R.C. § 311(b)(1) ("If - (A) a corporation distributes property (other than an obligation
of such corporation) to a shareholder in a distribution to which subpart A applies, and (B) the
fair market value of such property exceeds its adjusted basis (in the hands of the distributing
corporation), then gain shall be recognized to the distributing corporation as if such property
were sold to the distributee at its fair market value.").
212. I.R.C. § 311(b)(2) ("Rules similar to the rules of section 336(b) shall apply for purposes
of this subsection.").
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tributed property shall be not less than the amount of the liability.213
This deemed fair market value rule is another codification of the Tufts
rule as applied to corporations, and it is consistent with § 7701(g) and
Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-2(b). Section 336(b) was enacted as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.214 Prior to the Tax Reform Act,
liquidating and nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property
generally did not trigger corporate level gain under the longstanding
General Utilities doctrine.215 Section 7701(g) was enacted two years
prior as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984.216 The House Ways and
Means Committee for the Tax Reform Act of 1986 did not specify
whether or not § 336(b) should be applied to other provisions of Sub-
chapter C.217 A few academics, as discussed in further detail below,
argue that it should. 218
To demonstrate, assume X Corporation decides to make a nonliqui-
dating distribution to its shareholder Mrs. Crane. The corporation
distributes Blackacre with a fair market value of $100x, adjusted basis
of $80x and subject to $120x of nonrecourse debt. X Corporation rec-
ognizes $40x of gain under §§ 311(b)(2) and 336(b) (i.e., the fair mar-
ket value of the distributed asset is deemed to be no less than the
debt). This result is nevertheless entirely consistent with Crane and
Tufts, as X Corporation presumably at one point received $120x of
Crane debt basis tax-free, and the corporation must now account for
such under Tufts.
If X Corporation above has $200x of current E&P, Mrs. Crane re-
ceived a distribution of property under § 301(a), the entire distribu-
tion of which would be treated as a dividend because the corporation
had sufficient E&P at the close of its tax year. If the corporation, on
the other hand, did not have sufficient E&P, such would have been a
return of her stock basis, and then a sale or exchange of the stock.
Section 301(b)(1), however, provides the "amount distributed" equals
the money received, plus the fair market value of any property re-
ceived. Under § 301(b)(2), the amount distributed is reduced (but not
213. I.R.C. § 336(b) ("If any property distributed in the liquidation is subject to a liability or
the shareholder assumes a liability of the liquidating corporation in connection with the distribu-
tion, for purposes of subsection (a) and section 337 , the fair market value of such property shall
be treated as not less than the amount of such liability.").
214. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 631(a), (c), 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
215. Gen. Util. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). The Tax Reform Act of
1986 effectively repealed this case as well as § 311(a)(2), which previously permitted a corpora-
tion to make certain distributions of appreciated assets to its shareholders without a corporate
level tax.
216. H.R. REP. No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 864 (1984).
217. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 55.
218. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 55.
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below zero) by any corporate liabilities the shareholder assumes, or
any liabilities to which the distributed property is subject to. Thus,
Mrs. Crane therefore receives nothing in the above distribution, other
than underwater property, and has no taxable income or gain. Section
301(d) then states Mrs. Crane's basis in the property "shall be the fair
market value of such property," notwithstanding any excess debt
assumed.
Professors Randall and Stewart in an article contend that this fair
market value basis limit to the distributee shareholder is inappropri-
ate, because the mortgage must ultimately be satisfied to retain the
property, regardless of the fair market value of the property.219 The
professors also argue the distributee shareholder's "amount distrib-
uted" in such a transaction would be a negative amount (i.e., $20x). If
the deemed fair market value rule of §§ 311(b)(2) and 336(b) were
applied at the shareholder level, the professors argue, the results
would be more consistent, because the amount distributed would be
zero and the basis in property would be equal to the amount of the
nonrecourse debt the property is subject to (i.e., $120x). The profes-
sors' argument fails to adequately consider, however, the statutory
language of § 301(b)(2), which expressly states that when reducing the
amount distributed for liabilities the amount shall be reduced "but not
below zero. ' 220 Under the expressed language of the statute, the
amount distributed stops at zero, and can never be a negative amount
(e.g., $20x). Although Mrs. Crane receives a limited fair market value
basis in the excess debt property, her amount realized upon a subse-
quent disposition or sale will also be limited under Treasury Regula-
tion § 1.1001-2(a)(3). 221 Therefore, the regulation ensures Crane and
Tufts' principles of symmetry are followed. 222
To demonstrate the regulation, assume Mrs. Crane disposes of the
property one year later, at a time when its basis and fair market value
are both $100x. The property continues to be subject to nonrecourse
debt of $120x. The purchaser provides no consideration other than
assumption of the debt. Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-2(a)(3) triggers
a correct result, as her amount realized will be limited to $100x (i.e.,
the amount of debt originally included in her acquisition basis). She
219. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 62.
220. I.R.C. § 301(b)(2) (2006).
221. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3) (1980).
222. Upon receiving the excess debt property, if the shareholder were then to pay down the
principal of the nonrecourse debt, presumably those payments are applied only against the debt
included in basis for the purposes of determining her amount realized under the treasury
regulation.
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will thus recognize no gain or loss under §1001.223 This again follows
the tax logic discussed in this article, as Mrs. Crane's tax-free basis was
previously limited. The professors' argument that applying a deemed
fair market value equal to the amount of the nonrecourse debt to the
shareholder's amount distributed under § 301(b)(2) and debt basis
under § 301(d) would "produce results that are consistent with the ec-
onomic substance of the transactions" is not necessarily true given the
regulation's corresponding adjustment to the amount realized. Put
another way, the regulation ensures the functional relationship be-
tween basis and amount realized is properly maintained. 224
The professors also take issue with the distributing corporation's tax
consequences. If you recall, X Corporation recognized $40x of gain in
the above distribution because of the deemed fair market value rule
under §§ 311(b)(2) and 336(b). 225 Because of the distribution, X Cor-
poration must also make proper adjustments to its E&P. A corpora-
tion's E&P reflects its ability to pay dividends. When a corporation
distributes appreciated property in a nonliquidating distribution, it in-
creases its E&P by any "E&P gain" from the distribution.226 E&P
gain is measured by the difference between the property's "E&P ba-
sis" and its fair market value under § 312(b).227 E&P is then reduced
by the fair market value of the appreciated property distributed under
§ 312(a). 228 Section 312(c), however, states in making adjustments to
E&P under subsections (a) or (b), "proper adjustment" shall be made
for any debt to which the distributed property is subject to, or any
debt the shareholder assumes in connection with the distribution.229
Rightfully so, the professors contend § 312 does not make any refer-
ence whatsoever to the special liability rule of §§ 311(b)(2) and 336(b)
223. I.R.C. § 1001.
224. T.D. 7741, 1981-1 C.B. 430 (1980) ("Some comments suggested that to the extent a liabil-
ity incurred by reason of the acquisition of property was excluded from the taxpayer's basis, its
discharge should not be treated as an amount realized. This is consistent with the Service's ruling
and litigating position and is adopted by the Treasury decision.").
225. I.R.C. §§ 311(b)(2), 336(b).
226. I.R.C. § 312(b)(1) ("On the distribution by a corporation, with respect to its stock, of any
property (other than an obligation of such corporation) the fair market value of which exceeds
the adjusted basis thereof - (1) the earnings and profits of the corporation shall be increased by
the amount of such excess .
227. Id.
228. I.R.C. § 312(a). E&P is also reduced by any taxes paid on the corporation's recognized
gain, if any. When loss property is distributed, E&P is reduced by the asset's adjusted basis
rather than its FMV. Id.
229. I.R.C. § 312(c) ("In making the adjustments to the earnings and profits of a corporation
under subsection (a) or (b), proper adjustment shall be made for - (1) the amount of any liability
to which the property distributed is subject, and (2) the amount of any liability of the corpora-
tion assumed by a shareholder in connection with the distribution.").
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for purposes of determining the "fair market value" of the distributed
asset for E&P purposes.230
For example, assume X Corporation's E&P basis is $80x in the pre-
vious example (i.e., the same as its tax basis). The corporation's E&P
gain is arguably either $20x ($100x - $80x) or $40x ($120x - $80x)
under § 312(b), depending on how fair market value is construed. As
for the E&P decrease, it is either a negative $20x ($100x - $120x) or
$Ox ($120x - $120x) as a result of the proper adjustment for debt,
again depending on whether or not a deemed fair market value is uti-
lized. 231 Section 312(a) and (c) are not clear on how to deal with a
negative decrease when the "adjustment" involves debt exceeding the
fair market of the asset distributed. The professors argue it is only
logical to ignore any negative decrease in the calculation, and thus
E&P in our example, under the traditional definition of FMV, would
be adjusted upward by $20x. 232 The professors also contend, however,
that this result is not entirely consistent with the underlying economic
realities of the transaction.233 This is because X Corporation's eco-
nomic ability to pay dividends was arguably enhanced by $40x when it
was relieved of $120x of debt encumbering land with an E&P basis of
$80x.
The professors state in a footnote that one could plausibly make an
argument that a negative decease of $20x mathematically is the same
as a positive increase of $20x (which would trigger the appropriate
$40x increase in E&P).234 On the other hand, if the fair market value
of the distributed asset is deemed to be at least equal to the amount of
debt relief E&P would be adjusted by $40x ($40x - $Ox) if the nega-
tive decrease is ignored. This result would adequately reflect the cor-
poration's increased ability to pay dividends. In light of such, the
professors state the deemed fair market value rule of §§ 311(b)(2) and
336(b) should be applied to § 312 for the purposes of calculating
E&P.235 This, of course, would have to be codified by Congress. This
author suggests one need not even stretch the imagination so far to
obtain such desired results, as § 7701(g) specifically states, "in deter-
mining the amount of gain or loss (or deemed gain or loss) with re-
spect to any property, the fair market value of such property shall be
230. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 60.
231. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 61-62.
232. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 61-62 ("While different interpretations may explain
how to deal with a negative decrease in E&P, it is doubtful the drafters of the statute contem-
plated such a result.").
233. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 61-62.
234. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 61 n.23.
235. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 64.
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treated as being not less than the amount of any nonrecourse indebt-
edness to which such property is subject. '236 It seems rational that the
above rule should equally apply to § 312(b) when determining E&P
gain, as the general principles are the similar to those for computing
"tax" gain. When computing tax gain, the deemed fair market value
rule applies to the distributing corporation, so why not for E&P gain?
The same holds true for Treasury Regulation § 1.1001-2(b), which re-
quires the full amount of discharged liabilities in the taxpayer's
amount realized, regardless of the fair market value of the security.237
As stated previously, § 312(c) provides a corporation is allowed to
make proper adjustments to account for liabilities under § 312(a) and
(b). 238 A proper adjustment for the purposes of the E&P increase and
decrease arguably includes deeming fair market value to be at least
equal to the nonrecourse debt assumed.
With liquidating distributions similar issues arise. The liquidating
corporation has a deemed fair market value equal to at least the
amount of debt assumed under § 336(b). 239 Shareholders receiving
liquidating distributions, rather than dividend treatment, receive sale
or exchange treatment. 240 Similar to nonliquidating distributions,
however, a shareholder's basis in the excess debt property is limited to
the property's fair market value under § 334(a). 241 As discussed
above, and among other academics, the fair market value limitation is
not as fatal as it appears at first glance due to the regulations requiring
remediating symmetrical treatment.242
To demonstrate, assume X Corporation makes a liquidating distri-
bution of Blackacre to Mrs. Crane (fair market value $100x, adjusted
basis $80x and subject to $120x nonrecourse debt) in complete re-
demption of her shares, which collectively have a basis of $150X.243
Under § 336(a), the corporation will recognize gain or loss as if it sold
the property to Mrs. Crane for its fair market value. 244 Because the
property is excess debt property it will have a deemed fair market
236. I.R.C. § 7701(g) (2006).
237. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(b) (1980).
238. I.R.C. § 312(c).
239. I.R.C. § 336(b).
240. I.R.C. § 1001.
241. I.R.C. § 334(a).
242. Crane, supra note 6, at 137-38 ("If, however, the debt is nonrecourse, the liability should
not produce additional basis; that is, it should not trigger an immediate additional loss. The
likelihood of actual payment on this debt is not sufficient to warrant taking payment into ac-
count at this time.").
243. This article is ignoring any share block issues concerning stock acquired at different times
with different allocated bases and holding periods.
244. I.R.C. § 336(a).
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value under § 336(b).2 45 X Corporation will recognize $40x in gain
(i.e., $120x - $80x). On the shareholder's side, rather than receiving a
dividend, Mrs. Crane has a sale or exchange of her stock. Section
331(a) provides, "amounts received by a shareholder in a distribution
in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full pay-
ment in exchange for the stock. '246 Section 331(c) further states that
for the purposes of determining gain or loss recognition the principles
of § 1001 apply.247
Professors Randall and Stewart contend the tax consequences to
the distributee shareholder in transactions such as the one above are
unclear depending on how fair market value is determined. 248 Mrs.
Crane's amount realized could be either $Ox or a negative $20x, result-
ing in a loss of $150x or a loss of $170x respectively. A negative
amount realized, however, does not make sense as she only has an
economic loss of $150x reflected in the basis of her stock.249 Mrs.
Crane would also be limited to a fair market value basis in the asset
under § 334(a).250 The professors argue that if fair market value were
deemed to be at least equal to the amount of the debt using the rule of
§ 336(b), the illogical consequence of a negative amount realized and
inflated tax loss would be avoided, as the amount realized would be
zero.251 The professors further state that the basis in such excess debt
property distributions should not be limited to the property's fair mar-
ket value, as the distributee nevertheless must satisfy the full amount
of debt to retain the property.2 52 With regard to determining Mrs.
Crane's gain or loss, this author would argue Mrs. Crane's amount
realized is limited to zero, under the general principles of § 1001 and
its regulations, which simply do not permit a negative amount real-
ized.253 When Mrs. Crane received the property she received an asset
of no value, and therefore her amount realized should rightfully be
245. I.R.C. § 336(b).
246. I.R.C. § 331(a).
247. I.R.C. § 331(c).
248. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 59 ("The obvious cause of this confusing result is that
a different definition of 'fair market value' is being applied at the corporate level than at the
shareholder level.").
249. Crane, supra note 6, at 129 ("There is one situation in which § 336(b) provides an appro-
priate result: That is, where the corporate debt associated with the property transferred is nonre-
course after the transfer. The shareholder takes the property subject to the debt, but he will
never be called upon to pay on the debt from his personal resources. As long as the fair market
value of the property exceeds the amount of the debt, the fact that the creditor has recourse only
against the encumbered property does not make a difference.").
250. I.R.C. § 334(a).
251. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 59.
252. Randall & Stewart, supra note 8, at 60.
253. 1.R.C. § 1001(b).
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zero. 254 The fact that her basis in the property distributed is limited to
fair market value is also economically consistent, as discussed previ-
ously the regulations prevent the full amount of liabilities in her
amount realized upon a later sale or disposition.
VII. CONCLUSION
As mentioned in this article, the cases of Crane and Tufts and the
tax-free receipt of income principles specified therein are an integral
part of the various Subchapter C provisions involving contributions
and distributions of excess debt property. A methodical journey
through the applicable statutory sections indicates consistent symmet-
rical treatment throughout, between a taxpayer's basis and amount
realized, which is critical to maintaining an economic reality that is not
distorted. This is a harmonious reality, because it prevents taxpayers
from claiming tax losses not economically suffered, and from receiving
the tax-free receipt of income which forever escapes taxation. Al-
though certain academics have argued that the fair market value stat-
utory limitations to basis on excess debt property produces
economically illogical and inconsistent results in the corporate context
this author disagrees. The functional relationship between basis and
the amount realized as originally conceived in Crane and Tufts is
maintained in Subchapter C with the assistance of the treasury
regulations.
254. Id.
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